Abstract. Silverman's game on intervals was analyzed in a special case by Evans, and later more extensively by Heuer and Leopold-Wildburger, who found that optimal strategies exist (and gave them) quite generally when the intervals have no endpoints in common. They exist in about half the parameter plane when the intervals have a left endpoint or a right endpoint, but not both, in common, and (as Evans had earlier found) exist only on a set of measure zero in this plane if the intervals are identical. The game of Double-Silver, where each player has its own threshold and penalty, is examined. There are several combinations of conditions on relative placement of the intervals, the thresholds and penalties under which optimal strategies exist and are found. The indications are that in the other cases no optimal strategies exist.
Introduction.
The game of Double-Silver is a generalization of Silverman's game, so we begin with a brief description of the latter and a brief survey of the literature on it. Silverman's game is a two-person zero-sum game in which, roughly speaking, the player with the higher number wins, unless it is too much higher than the other, in which case the high number loses. More precisely, players I and II have pure strategy sets S I and S II which may be somewhat arbitrary sets of positive real numbers. There are two parameters, the threshold, T > 1, and the penalty, ν > 0. In a play of the game, player I chooses a number x from S I , player II chooses a number y from S II , and the higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other number, in which case it loses ν. Thus, the payoff function K s (x, y) is given by A special case of this game with S I = S II equal to the positive integers, with ν = 1 and special values of T , was introduced in the 1970s by David Silverman. Evans [1] analyzed the game for S I = S II = (A, B) , an open interval, finding that optimal mixed strategies exist only under very stringent conditions on the parameters, and obtaining optimal strategies when these conditions are fulfilled. Evans and Heuer [2] examined the symmetric game (S I = S II ) on discrete strategy sets (no accumulation points) and obtained explicit optimal mixed strategies except for some cases when the penalty ν is too near to zero. The asymmetric game on discrete sets is studied in [3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12] , and the game on intervals is studied in [5, 7, 10, 11] . The monograph [11] is the best and most complete reference on the subject, superseding much of the earlier work.
In the game on intervals, it turns out that it is precisely the equality of the two intervals which makes it difficult for optimal mixed strategies to exist. The quadrant {(T , ν) : T > 1, ν > 0} roughly divides into two parts (each of unbounded measure), in one of which no optimal strategies exist when the left endpoints are equal, and in the other of which none exist when the right endpoints are equal. When both are equal (i.e., S I = S II ), optimal strategies exist only on the boundary between these two parts. When the intervals have no endpoints in common, optimal strategies nearly always exist. In all cases when they are known to exist, explicit optimal mixed strategies and game value are known (see [11, Chapters 2, 3, 4] ).
In [4] , a similar game on equal intervals is examined. Here the payoff is again a function of y/x, but instead of a step function, it is a continuous, piecewise linear function. The paper [13] reports on some experiments with a very simple case of Silverman's game, using university students as subjects.
In the game Double-Silver, each player has its own threshold and penalty. We use T and ν for the threshold and penalty for player I; U and µ for player II. Thus the payoff function is
The thresholds T and U are any numbers larger than 1, and the penalties µ and ν can be any positive numbers. Let
We adopt the usual convention that player I has the interval with the minimum left endpoint, which, without loss of generality, we may take to be 1. Thus the interval for player I will be S I = (1,B) and that for player II, S II = (A, D), with 1 ≤ A. We denote by E(F, G) the expected payoff when player I uses strategy F and player II uses G. 
The case
G 0 on (A, B) such that E(F 0 ,G 0 ) ≤ 0. (Indeed, E(F 0 ,F 0 ) = 0.) For x in (A/U, A] and y in [A, B), K(x, y) is µ, 0, or −1, so K(x, y) ≤ µ. Thus E F,G 0 ≤ µf 1 + µf 2 + 0f 3 ≤ µ,(2.
Games with
A > 1 in which penalty ν does not occur. In our next group of theorems, we shall have optimal strategies for player I all lying within the interval (1, AT ) . This means that the penalty payoff ν does not occur, since with y > A and x < AT we always have x < Ty. The following probability vectors P n and Q n will occur in describing optimal strategies.
(recall from (1.3) that u = µ + 1), and
These are optimal strategies for a certain finite matrix game, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For the n × n game with payoff matrix
the game value is 4) and optimal strategies for players I and II are given by the vectors P n and Q n , respectively, of (3.1) and (3.2) . In fact, the dot product of P n with each column of H is equal to V n , as is the dot product of Q n with each row of H.
Proof. It suffices to prove the last statement. The dot product of P n with the first column of H is clearly equal to V n . For 1 ≤ r ≤ n, the difference H ·r +1 − H ·r of the (r + 1)th and the r th columns of H is 0,...,0,u,−2, 0,...,0 t , (3.5) where u = µ + 1 is in the r th position. The dot product
so P H ·r = V for each r , 1 ≤ r ≤ n. The corresponding fact for Q is clear from the symmetry. 
and assume that
Then the value of the game is V n+1 (see (3.4) ), and the following piecewise uniform mixed strategies F and G are optimal for players I and II, respectively:
where ρ > 1 but small enough that ρ < A, Aρ < U , U n ρ ≤ min{B, AT }, and AT ρ < D.
The piecewise uniform strategies are to be understood as follows: the strategy F distributes the probability p n+1,1 uniformly over the interval (1,ρ), p n+1,2 uniformly over interval (U , U ρ), and so forth.
Note that (3.10) is satisfied, in particular, whenever µ ≥ 1 and ν ≥ 1.
Proof. Figure 3 .1 depicts the interval layout and probability distributions for the case n = 3. We first show that E(F, y) ≥ V n+1 for all y > A, where E(F, y) denotes the expected payoff of mixed strategy F against pure strategy y.
by Lemma 3.1, and for
is linear in y and therefore constant at V n+1 , since that is the value at each endpoint. Thus E(F, y) = V n+1 for A < y ≤ U n+1 , and for y > U n+1 , E(F, y) can only increase or remain constant. Thus
by Lemma 3.1. In particular,
remains less than or equal to V n+1 . Finally, for x > AU n ρ, E(x, G) can only decrease or remain constant, so we have E(x, G) ≤ V n+1 for all x > 1.
If we change condition (3.8) to make B ≤ U n instead of U n < B, and require B < D,
we get a similar result, but using the probability vectors P n and Q n instead of P n+1 and Q n+1 , and with game value V n in place of V n+1 . This result is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let S I and S II be strategy sets and n be defined as in (3.7) . Assume that
Then the value of the game is V n , and the following piecewise uniform mixed strategies F and G are optimal for players I and II, respectively: We show first that E(F, y) ≥ V n for all y > A.
is linear in y, and is equal to V n at both ends, so it has constant value V n . For y > U n−1 ρ, E(F, y) can only increase or remain constant. Thus E(F, y) ≥ V n for all y > A.
Now we show that E(x, G) ≥ V n for all x in (1,B). Assume first that
and for
is linear in x, and is equal to V n at both ends, so it has constant value V n . Thus we have E(x, G) = V n for all x, 1 < x < B. If B < U n , then in the case of k = n − 1 in (3.20) instead of We may also drop condition (3.9) in Theorem 3.2 if we require D > B. We give the details in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Let S I and S II be strategy sets and let n be as defined in (3.7). Assume, as in Theorem 3.2, that
but in place of (3.9) , that
Then the value of the game is V n+1 , and the following piecewise uniform mixed strategies F and G are optimal for players I and II, respectively:
25)
where ρ > 1 but small enough that ρ < A, ρ < U, U n ρ ≤ min{B, AT }.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.2 applies with only minimal change. Strategy F is unchanged, and that E(F, y) ≥ V n+1 , for all y > A, did not depend on (3.9), so this remains true here. For strategy G, only the placement of the probability q n+1,n+1 has changed. So long as this lies at or above B and below U n+1 , E(x, G) remains less than or equal to V n+1 for all x in (1,B) . 
and either
Let P n , Q n , and V n be as defined by (3.1) , (3.2) , and (3.4) . Then the game value is V n and the following piecewise uniform mixed strategies F and G are optimal for players I and II, respectively: Proof. Figure 4 .1 depicts the layout for n = 4. We first show that E(F, y) ≥ V n for all y > 1. We use the expression E(F, 1+) to denote lim y→1+ E(F, y). Starting from E(F, 1+) = p n,1 + ··· + p n,n > V n , E(F, y) decreases linearly for 1 < y < ρ to E(F, ρ) = −p n,1 +p n,2 +···+p n,n = V n , and this value remains constant for ρ ≤ y ≤ U .
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is linear in x and is equal to V n at each end, so it has constant value V n . The case and a simple algorithm for obtaining the optimal strategies may be given. We illustrate first with the special case where m = 3 and n = 2. Then B and D are each greater than or equal to a 5 , and the optimal strategies are played on the interval (1,a 5 ). 
(4.6) 
is linear in y, and therefore has constant value V , since that is the value at each endpoint. Thus E(F, y) = V for 1 ≤ y ≤ a 5 , and for y > a
For strategy G we have
Thus E(x, G) = V at each of the interval endpoints, and by linearity,
We note that P and Q in (4.4) are the optimal strategies for the matrix game with payoff matrix
We now give the general theorem. be the probability vectors, with the idea that F will assign the probability p i to be distributed uniformly over the interval (a i−1 ,a i ) for each i with 1
(4.12)
Note that and then one condition (4.10) is exactly what is needed to get 0 in the last equation of (4.13). We then divide by the sum of the components of P to make it a probability vector, and let V be the common value of E(F, a k ). and the theorem is proved.
Other cases.
In all the above theorems but the last (Theorem 4.2), the first player has an optimal strategy in which the penalty ν never comes into play, and the game value is independent of ν. (Note that V n defined in (3.4), depends on u = µ +1 but not on v = ν + 1.)
The theorems above may well include all, or very nearly all, situations in which optimal strategies exist. These theorems, like most of the theorems about Silverman's game on intervals in [10, 11] , were discovered using a technique for producing, from the game on a pair of intervals, a pair of (finite) matrix games, the solutions to which give highly useful information about the game on intervals. The values of these matrix games represent the best expected payoffs of which each of the two players can assure themselves when restricting to certain special types of mixed strategy distributions. Equality of the two values implies that optimal strategies exist and that the common value is the game value. Inequality does not, on the face of it, imply that no optimal strategies exist, but in the case of Silverman's game, we were nearly always able to use the information to prove nonexistence. This technique (for using certain matrix games to elicit information about games on intervals) seems likely to be more widely applicable, and we hope to examine this further in a future work. In every situation where we alter the hypotheses in such a way that none of the theorems above applies, we obtain different values for these two associated matrix games. This leads us to strongly suspect that no optimal strategies exist, but proofs would be rather long and technical and we have not actually carried out proofs in any of the cases.
